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Purpose - We explore the impact of financialization on income inequality for a panel of 19 
OECD countries over the period 2000-2017. We control for the effect of banking crises, credit 
market regulation, and globalization, among other factors. 
Design/methodology/approach - We use three proxies for income inequality and four proxies 
for financialization. We employ a panel fixed effects approach using Driscoll and Kraay’s 
(1998) nonparametric covariance matrix estimator which produces standard errors that are 
robust to general forms of cross-sectional dependence.  
Findings - We provide evidence which to a great extent supports the view that the process of 
financialization has increased income inequality. In the disposable Gini specifications, two out 
of the four financialization measures are found to significantly contribute to rising inequality 
whilst in the specification with the market income Gini coefficient, three out of the four 
financialization proxies appear to adversely affect inequality. In the specification with the Gini 
coefficient based on manufacturing pay, the evidence is weak. Furthermore, trade unions 
appear to play a significant role in reducing inequality in two out of the three Gini specifications 
while the effect of credit market regulation is rather ambiguous.  
Originality - Our findings suggest a positive relationship between financialization and income 
inequality, however, the results depend on the proxies used to measure financialization and 
income inequality. We conclude that the process of financialization in triggering income 
inequality is complex and merits additional research.  
 




Broadly speaking, the term financialization describes a specific process over a certain period 
during which capitalism has evolved into a system dominated by the rise of finance as a key 
determinant of both economic and social activities. According to Epstein (2005, p. 3), 
financialization entails “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial 
actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies”. 
Alternatively, the term financialization describes the development of financial capitalism 
where the debt-to-equity ratios increase and financial services account for an ever-increasing 
share of income in an economy relative to other sectors. 
The global 2008 financial crisis, which brings to memory the old debate on the link 
between economic downturns and inequality, is thought to be nurtured by a deregulated 
economic environment that emerged in the 1980s (Prasad, 2005). Through massive transfers 
of funds to the financial sector from other economic sectors, including taxpayers (Tomaskovic-
Devey and Lin, 2011), financialization seems to be associated with growing income inequality, 
especially in the most developed economies. The frequent occurrence of financial crises in 
developed economies is thought to be triggered by the inherent contradictions and volatility 
permeating deregulated and highly leveraged financial markets, leading to disruptions in 
income distribution (Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2015). Further evidence on the relationship 
between bank regulation and income suggests that changes in institutions and deregulation of 
various industries significantly impact wage inequality (Fortin and Lemieux, 1997). Despite 
the emerging evidence on the impact of financialization on rising income inequality (see for 
instance, Zalewski and Whalen, 2010; Assa, 2012; Kus, 2012; Van Arnum and Naples, 2013), 
there are still open questions about this relationship and several forces at play that require 
additional research in the foreseeable future (Epstein, 2015).  
Τhe concept of financialization is multifaceted; it might refer to the activities of the 
financial sector, the increase in the size of the financial sector, or even the increasing use of 
financial instruments by non-financial corporations. Undoubtedly, financialization is thought 
to have contributed to increasing income inequality through different channels, including 
macroeconomic policies. For instance, sustained quantitative easing has resulted in zero-low-
bound or even negative interest rates, hence fuelling a potential formation of bubbles. At the 
same time, the implementation of austerity policies has adversely affected those in need of 
government assistance. When measured through its impact on income inequality, 
financialization can also be explained through the marketization lens, as this is reflected by the 
sustained increase in the social activity that is currently devoted to securities trading in the 
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financial markets. As De Vita and Luo (2020, p. 2) eloquently put it, the channels through 
which different financialization dimensions can affect income inequality “range from a 
weakening of certain policies and institutions that help keep income disparity in check to a shift 
from the traditional ‘retain and reinvest’ policy of nonfinancial firms to a new profit model that 
emphasizes prioritizing shareholders' dividends that feed the income of the wealthy”.  
Furthermore, the way capitalism has evolved as an economic system has led to a shift 
in power relations between capital and labor. As a result, income distribution has shifted 
sharply in favor of capital, leaving working-class households struggling to maintain existing 
consumption patterns whilst at the same time dampening domestic demand. The already 
established but inconclusive evidence on socio-economic channels through which financial 
accumulation affect income inequality has provided the impetus to delve deeper into the 
financialization-inequality nexus literature.  
Given the above, this paper attempts to contribute to the discussion on the 
financialization-inequality nexus by using three different proxies for inequality and four 
different proxies for financialization whilst at the same time controlling inter alia for 
globalization, credit regulation, and banking crises. In this direction, we generate novel 
evidence by employing an econometric technique which unlike those used in previous 
empirical studies addresses several estimation issues such as the one of cross-sectional 
dependence, hence providing more robust and reliable estimates. Using a panel data 
methodology, we identify the linkages between the dimensions of financialization and income 
inequality in 19 developed economies over the period 2000 to 2017. The yielding evidence 
suggests that financialization has a positive effect on income inequality when we consider 
disposable income and market income Gini coefficient measures. However, when a Gini 
coefficient based on manufacturing pay is considered, three out of the four proxies used to 
capture financialization are found to be insignificant. The effect of credit regulation is 
ambiguous whilst trade unions appear to be playing an influential role in alleviating household 
market income inequality.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 elaborates on the theoretical 
underpinnings of financialization and its relationship with income inequality. Section 3 
discusses the dataset and the empirical framework employed to arrive at the results presented 




2. Background to financialization 
Financialization is a relatively new term, which refers to the increase in size and importance of 
a country’s financial sector relative to its overall economy. The most-cited definition from 
Epstein (2005) states: “financialization means the increasing role of financial motives, financial 
markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and 
international economies”.  The institutional setting of financialization has been largely framed 
in an environment dominated by deregulated financial and labor markets (Sawyer, 2017). The 
nature of economic liberalization that has emerged across many advanced economies has paved 
the way for the financialization of capitalism from its predecessor, industrial capitalism.  
Several scholars have attempted to provide insightful accounts concerning the impact 
of financialization on economic activity. Possibly the most dominant trend that has provided 
the lead for others to follow is the one proposed by Hilferding (1981). According to Hilferding, 
the rise to power of a class of finance capitalists provides the platform upon which their 
influence and that of financial markets on economic outcomes and policies can be critically 
analyzed. 
The financialization of industrial and commercial capital has been evident since the 
1980s with the banking sector predominantly seeking profits in financial markets whilst 
households were drawn into complex financial transactions to boost their borrowing ability or 
their net worth. The implication of this development is of paramount importance as the 
activities of the financial sector have shifted away from the traditional intermediating role of 
“linking savings to investments towards the financing of consumer debt, the expansion of 
financial assets and financial liabilities, and the trading of existing financial assets” (Sawyer, 
2015, p.1). Although it can be argued that industrial and financial capital developed a symbiotic 
relationship in advanced economic systems, there is evidence that the conflict between 
industrial and financial capital has negatively affected real economic activity. In this context, 
Argitis and Pitelis (2001, 2008) and Alexiou and Nellis (2016), argue that the financialization 
of large corporations has harmed their long-term investment strategies with the distribution of 
profits between industry and finance playing an instrumental role in affecting capital 
accumulation. In the same spirit, Minsky (1982, 1986) argues that the financial practices of the 
non-financial corporate sector can have a significant impact on an economy that is inherently 
fragile and unstable, whilst Harcourt and Sardoni (1995) sustain that existing imbalances 
between finance capital and industrial capital can be legitimate sources of market volatility, 
hence resulting in dwindling private sector liquidity which in turn stifles investment (Davidson, 
1978).  
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It is also worth noting that financial capitalism is closely associated with the behavior 
of rentiers, private bankers, currency speculators, portfolio investors as well as central bankers 
and their business activities, i.e. speculation in money and capital markets. Crotty and Epstein 
(1996) and Crotty (2009) argue that as these groups grow in importance the more likely it is 
for financial capitalists to control both industrial and commercial capital. Epstein (2001) and 
Argitis and Pitelis (2001) studied the impact of financial capital on income distribution and 
articulately delineated the role of tight monetary policy and inflation targeting during the 
process of financialization.  
Arguably, the perception that all financial activities add value to an economy’s GDP or 
create employment opportunities might be misleading. The notion that highly skilled personnel 
working in banks and financial innovation have positive spillover effects on society per se 
should be carefully evaluated. Alexiou and Nellis (2016, p. 155) argue that “financial 
innovation and advances in information and communications technologies have facilitated 
capital mobility but without any explicit policy directives by governments, capital controls 
would have prevented the globalization of finance and the increasing integration of national 
financial markets”. What is even more extraordinary about financial capital vis-à-vis industrial 
capital is its exploitative nature since profits can be extracted indiscriminately across all levels 
of money income. Financial profit constitutes a significant percentage of total profit in many 
advanced economies (ILO, 2009).  
According to Philippon (2007), the time evolution of the financial sector’s share of total 
US GDP from 1860 onwards is indicative of the dominance of financial capital. In particular, 
the financial sector’s share of US GDP has grown from about 2% in the late 19th century to 
4.9% in 1980, and further to 8.3% in 2007 without showing any trends of mitigation as one 
would expect in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. As Orhangazi (2008, p. 35) further 
explains, “when we look at the US economy in the late 19th century, we see a period 
characterized by a large and powerful financial sector accompanied by the dominance of 
monopolies and oligopolies”. Alexiou and Nellis (2016) conclude that financialization has had 
a profound impact on the entire system of economic and institutional relations between finance, 
industry, and labor, between global finance and national economies, and between states and 
markets in a rapidly changing economic environment. 
 
Financialization and income inequality 
Undoubtedly, the process of financialization that has been gathering momentum since the 
1970s, appears to be the driving force behind large financial gains registered in the balance 
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sheets of financial institutions. Despite the expansionary effect that financialization might have 
had in generating value-added and employment in the financial sector (see Assa, 2012), there 
is evidence to suggest however that the rapid growth in financial activities, particularly in 
nonfinancial industries, has had negative distributional effects (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; 
Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2015). 
On the empirical front, the evidence regarding the impact of financialization on income 
inequality has been rather mixed. More specifically, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and 
Claessens and Perotti (2007), suggest that the benefits of more efficient financial markets will 
only be harnessed by the already wealthy individuals and established firms, whilst Beck et al. 
(2007) in a study on the impact of financial development on inequality for 72 countries spanning 
the period 1960-2005 find that financial development reduces income inequality. Furthermore, 
Delis et al. (2014) find that financial liberalization has a negative and significant effect on 
income which turns insignificant when low-income countries are considered. In the same spirit, 
Agnello et al. (2012) find that financial reforms negatively affect income inequality, but this 
effect is contingent upon the nature of the liberalization policies implemented. In a different 
study that gauges the impact of globalization on income inequality, Jaumotte et al. (2013) find 
that financial globalization might explain income dispersion whereas trade globalization 
reduces income inequality. 
Alexiou and Nellis (2016) suggest that the credit expansion that has followed the 
deregulation of the financial sector has to a large extent, through mainly speculative activity, 
contributed to the inherently unstable financial system that led-up to the financial crisis in 2008. 
Deregulation initiatives in the USA for instances such as the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, 
the Financial Services Modernization Act, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
accelerated bank mergers hence promulgating the too-big-to-fail argument, empowered banks 
to speculate using their customers’ deposits, and provided bail out insurance to failing banks 
(Krippner, 2011; Wright and Rogers, 2015). In this context, Lin (2016) suggests that credit 
expansion indirectly through the channel of accumulation of corporate debt adversely affects 
long-term investment activity and hence employment. As growth in the nonfinancial sector 
dwindles and profitability in the financial sector increases, the incessant pressure on incomes 
of nonfinancial workers leads to increases in income inequality (Evans, 2003; Tomaskovic-
Devey and Lin, 2011; Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2015). Among the recent studies, Knon and 
Roberts (2015) using a panel data set of 18 advanced industrial economies in the period 1988-
2008 found that the interactions of financialization with measures of the new economy are 
positively correlated with income inequality. 
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On the distributional aspects of financialization, Dünhaupt (2013, p. 2) argues that “the 
process of financialization can roughly be described as the increasing importance of the 
financial sector which has an impact on the distribution between wages and profits on the one 
hand, and retained earnings and financial income in the form of dividends and interests on the 
other hand”. The rise in continental European labor’s shares of income in the 1970s was to a 
great extent attributed to institutional reforms and real wages increases above labor 
productivity (Bertoli and Farina, 2007). The response of firms was to restore profit shares by 
substituting labor demand with an increase in capital-intensive production (Blanchard, 1997).  
In the same line of argument, Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013), argue that financialization 
drives wages for financial employees whilst limits wage growth for nonfinancial workers. They 
also find that the surge of financial income in the US over the period 1970 to 2008 adversely 
affected the labor share of income, whilst Alvarez (2015) finds that increased dependence on 
financial profits drives the wage share in nonfinancial firms down over the period 2004 to 2013. 
Further corroborating evidence is provided by Köhler et al. (2018) confirming the negative 
effects of financialization on the wage share of labor.  
In another recent study, Sawyer (2017) argues that financialization has been associated 
with the ‘rise of the push’ for the maximization of shareholder value. In this process, 
financialization is viewed in terms of increasing shareholder power relative to management 
and workers, and a higher rate of return to rentiers on bond and equity holdings all of which 
hurt firms' real investment. At the same time, the deepening of financialization is associated 
with the build-up of financial risk (Szopa, 2017) thus, affecting the stability of the entire 
economy. 
Additionally, Van Arnum and Naples (2013) studied the relationship between financial 
sector growth and income inequality and suggested that financialization has adversely affected 
employment creation and minimum wage and exacerbated income inequality as well (Van 
Arnum and Naples, 2013). Using panel data for 20 OECD countries, Kus (2012) provided 
evidence according to which financialization, as proxied by three different ratios (i.e. stock 
traded, bank profitability, and securities under bank assets), has a positive association with 
income inequality whilst union density is a key variable through which this effect is mediated.  
First-generation studies on the impact of unionization on wage inequality concluded 
that declining unionization explained around 15 to 20% of the increase in wage inequality in 
the 1980s (Card, 1992; Gosling and Machin, 1995). Second-generation studies however using 
more advanced econometric methodologies provided a more complete picture of the effect of 
unions in wage inequality. In particular, DiNardo and Lemieux (1997) implementing a re-
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weighting technique, found that increased unionization in 1981 reduced the variance of male 
wages by 6 percent in the US and 10 percent in Canada, whereas in 1988 the corresponding 
estimates were 3 percent in the US and 13 percent in Canada, respectively. In other words, 
changing unionization in the USA has caused wage inequality whereas in the case of Canada 
the causal relationship runs in the opposite direction. On the same wavelength, Gordon (2012) 
argues that declining unionization has been the culprit behind a one-third increase in income 
inequality in the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
We study the determinants of the relationship between inequality and financialization for 19 
advanced economies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA. We estimate unbalanced panels with annual data 
spanning the period 2000-2017. Our effort to use more countries and a longer time period was 
hampered by data availability, however, our dataset effectively captures key characteristics of 
developed capitalist economies in the recent era, i.e. the diminished role of the State, 
privatization, increased trade, and deregulation. 
In our estimated models, income inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient and for 
comparison purposes, we employ three alternatives: a Gini index of inequality in equivalized 
household disposable income (post-tax, post-transfer) and a Gini index of inequality in 
equivalized household market income (pre-tax and pre-transfer) both retrieved from the 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) which was developed by Solt 
(2020), and a Gini index of inequality developed by Galbraith and Kum (2005) which is based 
on manufacturing pay data but does not include other income sources such as transfers. 
All estimated models include a set of independent variables, the nature of which reflects 
inter alia the business cycle, economic and financial stability, and credit regulation. In this 
context, it is suggested that potential determinants of inequality, includes amongst others, 
unemployment, productivity, trade, GDP per capita to capture the level of economic 
development, FDI net inflows, union density, R&D expenditure, inflation as a measure of 
economic stability, and education to capture the level of human capital. We also include a 
dummy variable to account for banking crises which was developed by Laeven and Valencia 
(2013) and a credit market regulations index to capture regulatory restraints that limit the 
freedom of exchange in credit markets. 
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For each of the three Gini measures of income inequality, we estimate four models 
(Models 1 to 4) all of which include the control variables described above and additional key 
proxy variables for financialization. Model 1 includes the percentage of deposit money bank 
assets to deposit money bank assets and central bank assets (depositassets), Model 2 uses the 
private credit by deposit money banks as a percentage of GDP (privatecredit), Model 3 includes 
bank deposits as a percentage of GDP (bankdeposits), and Model 4 includes domestic credit to 
private sector as a percentage of GDP (domcredpri). Table 1 provides detailed descriptions of 
the variables and their sources while Table 2 presents the summary statistics. 
[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
It is well established that spatial or spillover effects can lead to cross-sectional 
dependence and, if ignored could result in biased statistical inference. We implemented the 
Pesaran (2015) cross-sectional dependence test where the rejection of the null hypothesis 
indicates the presence of strong dependency. The results are presented in the Appendix and 
suggest that innovations to the variables are strongly cross-sectional dependent. To account 
for this, we employ a panel fixed-effects approach using the Driscoll and Kraay’s (1998) 
nonparametric covariance matrix estimator which produces heteroscedasticity- and 
autocorrelation-consistent standard errors that are robust to general forms of cross-sectional 
dependence. 
 
4. Empirical results and discussion 
The panel estimation results for the three different dependent variables employed are presented 
in Tables 3 to 5. In Table 3, where income inequality is proxied by the Gini coefficient based 
on household disposable income, we note that two out of the four proxies that purport to gauge 
the impact of financialization on inequality are found to be statistically significant and positive, 
hence supporting the view that the increasing role of financial markets might harm the 
distribution of income as also suggested by Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012), Jauch and Watzka 
(2015) and Tomaskovic-Devey et al. (2015), among others. In line with Jauch and Watzka 
(2015), it seems that excessive finance leads to the appearance of rent-seeking in financial 
markets and its appropriation by a minority that effectively leads to increased income 
inequalities. 
[Table 3 about here] 
The results further suggest the highly significant effect of unemployment, productivity, 
education, and credit market regulation in triggering inequality, thus impacting negatively 
societal cohesion. In particular, education is found to be significant in three out of four 
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estimated models suggesting that it can potentially amplify income inequality, and although 
this might appear surprising it is in line with Willen et al. (2004, p. 1) who suggest that 
education affordability drives down the wage of unskilled workers and raises the skill premium. 
The impact of banking crises is found to be rather ambiguous with a significant positive impact 
in two out of four models while credit market regulation is positive and highly significant in 
all specifications. This last finding indicates that more intense regulation increases household 
disposable income inequality as “entrepreneurs at the bottom rungs of the income distribution 
may have relatively greater difficulty surmounting costly barriers to entry” (McLaughlin and 
Stanley, 2016, p.2). Finally, the fact that productivity appears to positively affect income 
inequality might be effectively explained if we consider the uneven growth of productivity 
across various economies. Top firms’ earnings exhibiting increasingly skewed returns as well 
as wage dispersion between firms, which reflects diverging rates of productivity growth, can 
to a certain extent explain the observed increase in income inequality (Furman and Orszag, 
2018). On top of this, financialization may have generated incentives for short-term profit 
maximization to the detriment of sufficiently channeling resources to more productive 
activities (Ramos, 2016). 
Turning our attention to the Gini proxy based on market income (Table 4), the yielded 
evidence suggests that three of the financialization proxies are positive and significant. We 
additionally notice that the effect of banking crises becomes stronger when R&D and 
unionization jointly become relevant in our analysis. Unionization is found to be highly 
significant bearing a negative sign, i.e. reduces income inequality, which is in line with Gordon 
(2012). Trade unions reduce inequality both by raising wages at the low end and by 
constraining them at the high end. Western and Rosenfeld (2011) estimate that the decline of 
labor unions’ power in the US economy is responsible for 20 to 33% of the overall rise in 
inequality. Also, R&D expenditure is positively associated with rising inequality suggesting 
that R&D expenses signal technological improvements which could result in rising incomes, 
yet in an uneven manner. The latter could indicate a skill-biased technological change as 
rewards disproportionately flow to highly skilled workers. In this view, educational progress 
and better schooling should normally be the key solution to containing inequality yet education 
is again found to be statistically significant and positive.  
[Table 4 about here] 
The finding regarding banking crises indicates that historically the financial burden in 
the aftermath of banking crises falls on taxpayers, mainly affecting lower incomes, thus 
spurring income inequality. The positive effect of banking crises on inequality is in contrast 
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with Agnello and Sousa (2012) who find that a banking crisis reduces inequality n OECD 
countries but in line with Li and Yu (2014) and Haan and Sturm (2017) who suggest that 
financial development and banking crises increase income inequality. Furthermore, Atkinson 
and Morelli (2010) in a study of 25 countries spanning the period 1911 to 2010 provide 
evidence on patterns of rising inequality that follow systemic banking crises. Their main 
findings, which are in line with Rajan’s hypothesis, suggest that income inequality in the USA 
was increasing before both the 1929 crash and the recent 2008 financial crisis. They note, 
however, that this observed pattern is not paramount across other countries.  The estimates for 
credit market regulation, unemployment, and productivity are in line with those reported in 
Table 3. 
Regarding the third inequality measure, the Gini index based on manufacturing pay, the 
results shown in Table 5, are also interesting and indicate that high unionization and credit 
market regulation are effective in reducing income inequality. It is worth noting that in the 
strong presence of negative effects from credit market regulation to inequality, the impact of 
the financialization proxies is somewhat neutralized with only one of them being significant. 
The latter finding might indicate that financialization is not a negative phenomenon per se as 
long as adequate and effective regulation is in place. Finally, the estimates for productivity are 
consistent with our previous findings, confirming the uneven wage dispersion and diverging 
productivity growth across economies.  
[Table 5 about here] 
Having considered all four different proxies for financialization (deposit money bank 
assets to deposit money bank assets and central bank assets, private credit by deposit money 
banks, bank deposits, and domestic credit to the private sector) the evidence suggests that 
private credit by deposit money banks has a consistent and significant positive effect on 
income inequality. In particular, when we consider the Gini coefficient based on manufacturing 
income only private credit remains significant. This puzzling result might be due to: (a) issues 
relating to the construction of the Gini income inequality index and (b) the diminishing share 
of manufacturing income as a percentage of total income, i.e. financial income in the form of 
capital gains, interest and dividends has increased considerably compared to the income 
generated through traditional economic activity.  
By and large, the generated evidence is consistent with Denk and Cazenave-Lacroutz 
(2015) hence suggesting that financialization is widening income inequality as people with 
high incomes enjoy unrestricted access to credit vis-à-vis lower income groups who are more 
likely to be turned down. On a different note, Godechot (2016) finds that the finance sector’s 
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share of GDP is a significant driver of inequality which when decomposed the volume of 
stocks traded in national stock exchanges and of shares held as assets in banks’ balance sheets 
are found to be the main factors that drive the entire process. His evidence also suggests that 
the financialization of nonfinancial firms and households do not appear to exert a significant 
impact.  
As far as credit regulation is concerned the generated evidence is very ambiguous. One 
interpretation can be that credit regulation is implemented by supervisory authorities to prevent 
and correct distortions in the credit markets which inevitably leads to more stringent regulations 
for operational banking procedures. In so far as these procedures are tailored to address 
corporate governance issues of banking, inequality is not thought to be affected significantly 
(Delis et al., 2014). A regulatory framework, however, that imposes higher restrictions on 
lending tends to produce bounded and less competitive markets. As such, it is expected that 
only well-established firms with sound credit records and high levels of collateral appear to 
have easier access to credit whereas the relatively weaker firms are severely constrained. Given 
that tighter regulation and hence, higher supervisory power, provides sound and effective 
financial-intermediation services, investment opportunities are expected to flourish. The 
resulting competitive environment will have a positive effect on lower-income households as 
funds will be allocated to innovative investment ideas. In this context, regulators should take 
preventive measures to restrict an explosive growth in finance and provide a stable and 
effective financial system. At the same time, regulators need to preserve the link between 
finance and real economic activity which will allow equal opportunities in accessing credit and 
sustaining economic fairness, hence reducing inequality.   
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This study explores the impact of financialization on income inequality whilst controlling for 
the effect of banking crises, credit market regulation, and globalization, among other factors. 
We provide new evidence on the inequality-financialization nexus using alternative proxies for 
inequality and financialization for a panel of 19 OECD countries during the period 2000-2017. 
In the disposable income Gini specifications, two out of the four financialization measures 
turned out to significantly contribute to rising inequality whilst in the market income Gini 
specifications, three out of the four financialization proxies were found to have exerted an 
adverse effect on inequality. When a Gini coefficient based on manufacturing pay is 
considered, all but one of the financialization proxies are insignificant. Furthermore, apart from 
trade unions which appear to be playing a significant role in reducing inequality in two out of 
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the three Gini specifications, the effects of some of the other control variables are somewhat 
mixed.  
Credit regulation is found to convey puzzling signals suggesting that further exploration 
should be pursued. It is reasonable to assume that banking regulation aims to support the 
stability of the financial system by absorbing shocks and preventing failures that potentially 
lead to crises. On the one hand, banking regulatory policies may have a positive effect on the 
distribution of income but on the other hand, ‘too-much’ bank regulation may adversely affect 
the real economy, especially in the long run. Generally speaking, financial regulation purports 
to enhance the creditworthiness of banks and insulate the financial sector from potential shocks. 
In this context, numerous studies suggest that regulations affect the banking sector in terms of 
shaping bank risk (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009; Agoraki et al., 2009), bank efficiency (Barth 
et al., 2010), as well as the frequency of banking crises (e.g., Barth et al., 2008). All in all, the 
extant literature on the relationship between credit regulation and financial stability remains 
inconclusive. However, the ambiguous effect observed in this study between credit regulation 
and income inequality is of particular interest, as its interpretation should be sought in 
frameworks wherein the role of political economy mechanisms assumes a more prominent role 
(see for instance Rajan, 1994, 2010 and Stiglitz, 2012). 
Furthermore, our results potentially suggest that there are certain aspects of financial 
activity that promotes increasing income inequality. Whilst credit activities to households and 
businesses might contribute negligibly to income inequality, other stealth, and more 
sophisticated activities around financial markets that are difficult to fathom might have a 
greater impact on inequality. In particular, the way financial markets function allows different 
actors (such as traders, etc.) to freely move their assets where it is more lucrative for them. 
Hyper-concentration in the finance sector not only does it increase the systemic risk but also 
contributes to the constant transfer of income from the productive sectors of the economies to 
the finance sector. Therefore, measures aimed at either deleveraging the colossal banks or even 
breaking them up might be needed to keep the sector in a healthy state. Ensuring solvency of 
the finance sector might require policies for further restructuring or more radical policies that 
tie the banking sector's profitability to economy-wide growth. After all, governments need 
banks to channel credit to the productive sectors so that the economy is recharged.  
As the literature that looks at the relationship between inequality and financialization 
keeps growing, there are still conundrums suggesting that it remains an unexplored area with 
several forces at play. Tackling inequality is a multi-faceted challenge for policymakers as 
there is growing, yet still blurred evidence of linkages with economic growth and globalization, 
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financialization and regulation, and downturns and upswings of the business cycle jointly with 
the not-so-uncommon occurrences of financial crises especially in advanced economies. 
Policymakers need to advance policies that foster real economic activity, support trade 
linkages, and provide employment opportunities to mitigate income inequality. At the same 
time, regulators should calibrate measures that meaningfully connect finance to the real 
economic activity but tame speculative behavior in the financial markets. Financial 
deregulation in conjunction with the growth and development of the global financial markets 
as well as the magnitude of financial rent expropriated during this process is a compelling case 
for further exploration. 
On the whole, rising income inequality is inextricably linked to rising volatility and 
uncertainty in advanced economies. In so far as prices of financial assets increase incessantly 
adding a close-to-nothing value in the real economy, inequality is bound to get worse hence 
creating a riskier economic environment. The Great Recession, as well as a growing body of 
research, has shown that financialization has increased inequality. Nonetheless, our results 
suggest that the subject relationship is not so straightforward and merits further research on the 








Table A1. Pesaran (2015) test for cross-sectional dependence 
Variable Test statistic (p-value) 
Ginidisp 10.078*** (0.000) 
Ginimkt 24.263*** (0.000) 
Ginimp 8.654*** (0.000) 
unemployment 53.665*** (0.000) 
productivity 55.397*** (0.000) 
trade 18.211*** (0.000) 
GDPpc 55.403*** (0.000) 
FDI 11.089*** (0.000) 
union 38.977*** (0.000) 
R&D 14.039*** (0.000) 
inflation 43.713*** (0.000) 
education 8.518*** (0.000) 
credmarkreg 55.340*** (0.000) 
bankcrisis 16.850*** (0.000) 
depositassets 10.522*** (0.000) 
privatecredit 6.672*** (0.000) 
bankdeposits 22.690*** (0.000) 
domcredpri 5.394*** (0.000) 
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Table 1.  
Description of variables 
Variables Definition Source 
Ginidisp Gini index of inequality based on household 
disposable income (post-tax, post-transfer) 
Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database 8.3, Solt 
(2020) 
https://fsolt.org/swiid/ 
Ginimkt Gini index of inequality based on household market 
income (pre-tax, pre-transfer) 
Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database 8.3, Solt 
(2020) 
Ginimp Gini index of inequality based on manufacturing pay 
(available only for 2000-2015) 
University of Texas 
Inequality Project, Galbraith 
and Kum (2005) 
https://utip.lbj.utexas.edu/ 
unemployment Unemployment (% of total labor force) World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
productivity Productivity (GDP per hour worked) Compendium of Productivity 
Indicators, OECD 
trade Sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
(% of GDP) 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
GDPpc Gross domestic product per capita (US dollars) Economic Outlook, OECD 
FDI Foreign direct investment net inflows (% of GDP) World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
union Union density: The ratio of wage and salary earners 
that are trade union members divided by the total 
number of wage and salary earners. 
Employment and Labour 
Markets statistics, OECD 
R&D Research and development expenditure (% of GDP) World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
inflation Inflation (%) World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
education School enrollment, secondary (% gross) World Bank 
credmarkreg Credit market regulation index (scale 0-10): This 
index reflects regulatory restraints that limit the 
freedom of exchange in credit markets and is the 
average of three sub-component ratings: a) an index 
that depicts the extent to which the banking industry 
is privately owned, b) an index about the extent to 
which credit is supplied to the private sector, and c) 
an index about whether controls on interest rates 
interfere with the credit market. 




bankcrisis Banking crisis dummy that takes the value 1 for a 
banking crisis and 0 otherwise). According to 
Laeven and Valencia (2013, p 228) a banking crisis 






financial distress in the banking system (bank runs, 
losses in the banking system, and/or bank 
liquidations), and there is significant banking policy 
intervention measures in response to significant 




depositassets Deposit money bank assets as a share of the sum of 
deposit money bank and central bank claims on 
domestic nonfinancial real sector (%) where deposit 
money banks comprise commercial banks and other 
financial institutions that accept transferable 
deposits, such as demand deposits while assets 
include claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector 
which includes central, state and local governments, 




privatecredit Private credit by deposit money banks (% of GDP): 
Financial resources provided to the private sector by 
domestic money banks where domestic money 
banks comprise commercial banks and other 
financial institutions that accept transferable 




bankdeposits Bank deposits (% of GDP): The total value of 
demand, time and saving deposits at domestic 
deposit money banks where deposit money banks 
comprise commercial banks and other financial 





domcredpri Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP): 
Financial resources provided to the private sector, 
such as through loans, purchases of nonequity 
securities, and trade credits and other accounts 
receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. 
Global Financial 
Development Database, 






Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Ginidisp 340 29.41 3.57 22.40 38.20 
Ginimkt 340 46.70 4.23 32.40 53.90 
Ginimp 278 37.83 2.85 30.53 44.50 
unemployment 342 6.581 3.32 2.100 26.09 
productivity 342 98.11 6.59 62.91 117.3 
trade 339 75.26 32.76 19.80 169.4 
GDPpc 342 38,744 9,412 18,083 67,051 
FDI 340 4.27 8.26 -8.014 87.44 
union 303 31.75 20.82 7.794 79.00 
R&D 290 2.28 0.76 0.88 4.28 
inflation 342 1.752 1.16 -1.35 4.67 
education 287 112.8 17.51 91.96 163.9 
credmarkreg 342 9.312 0.72 6.85 10 
bankcrisis 342 0.12 0.32 0 1 
depositassets 324 97.03 5.25 68.21 100.00 
privatecredit 319 106.1 34.98 37.84 211.9 
bankdeposits 300 85.75 37.98 39.38 221.0 







Dependent variable Gini index of inequality based on household disposable income 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
unemployment 0.098*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.090*** 
  (0.021) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) 
productivity 0.076*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.081*** 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) 
trade 0.002 0.002 -0.005 0.003 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
ΔlnGDPpc -0.490 -0.449 -0.164 -0.535 
  (1.471) (1.393) (1.409) (1.338) 
FDI -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
union -0.026 -0.017 -0.024 -0.018 
  (0.025) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) 
R&D 0.346 0.300 0.217 0.287 
  (0.200) (0.175) (0.153) (0.163) 
inflation -0.047 -0.046 0.002 -0.046 
  (0.041) (0.038) (0.042) (0.040) 
education 0.008 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
credmarkreg 0.380*** 0.383*** 0.225** 0.379*** 
  (0.092) (0.093) (0.081) (0.099) 
bankcrisis 0.269** 0.182 0.141 0.184** 
  (0.111) (0.087) (0.105) (0.081) 
depositassets -0.021    
  (0.011)    
privatecredit  0.004**   
   (0.002)   
bankdeposits   0.011  
    (0.006)  
domcredpri    0.005*** 
     (0.001) 
Constant 18.556*** 15.288*** 16.783*** 15.397*** 
  (3.214) (2.745) (2.417) (2.788) 
Observations 218 222 207 222 
R2 within 0.553 0.553 0.586 0.556 
Note(s): Driscoll and Kraay’s (1998) robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 






Table 4.  
Dependent variable Gini index of inequality based on household market income 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
unemployment 0.281*** 0.266*** 0.282*** 0.277*** 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.024) 
productivity 0.126*** 0.121*** 0.118*** 0.119*** 
  (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) 
trade -0.009 -0.006 -0.015 -0.006 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
ΔlnGDPpc 0.649 1.188 1.708 0.878 
  (1.858) (1.552) (1.948) (1.561) 
FDI -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
union -0.087*** -0.081** -0.092*** -0.089** 
  (0.025) (0.033) (0.028) (0.032) 
R&D 1.504*** 1.446*** 1.375*** 1.425*** 
  (0.228) (0.224) (0.184) (0.216) 
inflation -0.046 -0.050 -0.003 -0.045 
  (0.056) (0.052) (0.064) (0.055) 
education 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
credmarkreg 0.638*** 0.650*** 0.654*** 0.641*** 
  (0.183) (0.172) (0.158) (0.180) 
bankcrisis 0.387** 0.255** 0.257** 0.288** 
  (0.153) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) 
depositassets -0.005    
  (0.014)    
privatecredit  0.010***   
   (0.002)   
bankdeposits   0.019**  
    (0.007)  
domcredpri    0.008** 
     (0.003) 
Constant 25.799*** 24.795*** 25.047*** 25.353*** 
  (2.418) (2.940) (2.792) (2.965) 
Observations 218 222 207 222 
R2 within 0.797 0.805 0.816 0.802 






Dependent variable Gini index of inequality based on manufacturing pay 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
unemployment 0.074 0.039 0.073** 0.058 
  (0.038) (0.037) (0.027) (0.031) 
productivity 0.067** 0.059*** 0.063*** 0.060*** 
  (0.025) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) 
trade -0.000 0.004 0.002 0.002 
  (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
ΔlnGDPpc -0.965 0.227 -0.623 -0.357 
  (2.055) (2.107) (1.834) (2.033) 
FDI 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.008 
  (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
union -0.141** -0.101*** -0.112*** -0.115*** 
  (0.049) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) 
R&D 0.282 0.351 0.334 0.335 
  (0.741) (0.655) (0.749) (0.702) 
inflation -0.045 -0.073 -0.080 -0.064 
  (0.086) (0.064) (0.079) (0.072) 
education -0.004 0.002 -0.004 0.001 
  (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
credmarkreg -0.498*** -0.482*** -0.334*** -0.501*** 
  (0.073) (0.084) (0.112) (0.078) 
bankcrisis -0.136 -0.280* -0.143 -0.203 
  (0.120) (0.141) (0.131) (0.136) 
depositassets 0.023    
  (0.033)    
privatecredit  0.012***   
   (0.004)   
bankdeposits   0.004  
    (0.011)  
domcredpri    0.006 
     (0.005) 
Constant 37.796*** 37.235*** 37.538*** 38.444*** 
  (6.022) (1.377) (1.571) (1.354) 
Observations 202 206 192 206 
R2 within 0.524 0.537 0.474 0.519 
Notes: Please see notes Table 3. 
 
 
 
